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I.

INTRODUCTION

Copyright law assumes that the author of a work is the
copyright owner. For novelists, painters, and composers, this
assumption works quite well. However, the economic realities
are somewhat different for software companies, motion picture
makers, and the creators of technical journals or product
manuals. For modern industry, it is less likely that a work will
be created by an individual author and more likely that a work
will be developed by a team of specialists in the scope of their
professional endeavors. Corporate employees may be located
across the globe or in their own homes, creating interrelated
components of a single copyrighted work. Business
arrangements for copyright must take these conditions into
account.
A “work made for hire” is a copyrighted work as to which
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared
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is considered the author for purposes of the Copyright Act
and—unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them—owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright. 1 Designation as a work for hire
affects the copyright in four primary ways: ownership, term,
moral rights, and termination rights. If a copyrighted work is a
work for hire, then the initial ownership vests in the employer,
rather than the employee or contractor, and that individual
enjoys none of the legal or beneficial attributes of authorship. 2
Current U.S. copyright law grants protection for the
lifespan of the author plus seventy years to allow the copyright
to benefit at least the author’s first-generation heirs. 3 Such a
measurement is inappropriate for a corporate author. Thus, a
work for hire has a somewhat arbitrary copyright term of “95
years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.” 4
This remains true even if the employer happens to be an
individual with a measurable lifespan. 5
The Copyright Act also explicitly specifies that a work
created as a work for hire cannot have protections under the
Visual Artists Rights Act, the limited moral rights protections
under U.S. copyright law. 6 As a result, a work of art such as an
oil painting, sculpture, or façade that is created as a work for
hire will not have any of the protections afforded an artist
under that Act to protect his or her right to claim authorship of
the work and to prevent the mutilation or destruction of the
work. 7
Perhaps, most significantly, the statutory protection for
authors to terminate grants of copyright, whether by

1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). These rights are: (1) the rights to reproduce
the copyrighted work, (2) prepare derivative works of it, (3) distribute copies to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending,
(4) perform and/or display the work publicly, (5) or, in the case of sound
recordings, perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission. Id. § 106.
2. Id. § 201(b).
3. Id. § 302(a) (applying to works created on or after January 1, 1978).
4. Id. § 302(c).
5. See id.
6. Id. §§ 101, 106A. The definition of “work of visual art” expressly
excludes any work made for hire. Id.
7. Id.; See e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003); Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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assignment or license, does not apply to works for hire. 8 A
copyright has historically been treated as having two separate
grant terms for most authors—an initial term and a renewal
term. 9 Although this two-term structure was dropped in the
current 1976 Copyright Act, one key aspect of this model was
retained: an author can terminate an assignee’s or licensee’s
right to the renewal term of works copyrighted prior to the
1976 Copyright Act 10 or can terminate any license or transfer
of a copyright made after January 1, 1978 (the effective date of
the 1976 Copyright Act) between thirty-five and fourty years
after the grant was made. 11
Since the copyright in a work for hire initially vests in the
employer rather than the employee, the law does not treat the
arrangement as a transfer of the copyright and, therefore, does
not provide the author the right to terminate the grant. 12 The
law also precludes the employer from using the Copyright Act
termination provisions to terminate its own grants to third
parties. 13 The elimination of the termination provisions
provides greater confidence that works created in the
employment environment will not be later recaptured through
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)–(d).
9. See id. § 304(c).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 203(a).
(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the
date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five
years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at
the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant,
whichever term ends earlier.
(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in
writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of
termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this
subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or
the grantee’s successor in title.
Id.
12. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c)–(d). The estate of comic book artist, Jack Kirby,
who is recognized for superhero characters like Iron Man and Spiderman,
recently served fourty-five notices of copyright termination on Marvel
Entertainment. In response, Marvel filed a lawsuit in New York Federal
District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that various comic book
creations were works for hire. The case is potentially worth billions of dollars.
Erline Aguiluz, Jack Kirby’s Estate Battles Marvel Over Copyright
Termination, N.Y. ESTATE PLANNING NEWS (Dec. 8, 2010, 8:59 AM),
http://newyorkestateplanningnews.com/2010/12/jack-kirbys-estate-battlesmarvel-over-copyright-termination.html.
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c)–(d).

492

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 12:2

terminations.
Although not as long as ninety-five years, the copyright
term of a work for hire, an initial grant of rights for thirty-five
years, seems quite long for corporate publishers. Few
copyrighted works of a business nature have shelf lives
measured in decades. Why then, is the longer term obtained
with work for hire important? The difference between a grant
of copyright from the author, and an automatic transfer of
copyright under the work for hire doctrine, might have longterm consequences.
For companies that rely on older works as the basis of
newer works, such as publishers of software, reference works,
or other works that change incrementally, the ability of authors
to terminate grants could become very disruptive. Software
code or sections of updated works would need to be stripped out
from versions of editions of the work that are published
following the termination. The consequence of this is not easy
to predict. Under the Copyright Act, the existing work can be
utilized but new updates would not be authorized. 14
Treatise author David Nimmer illustrates this consequence
using motion picture production as the example:
[A] grant of motion-picture rights in a novel will authorize the
preparation of a motion picture based upon the novel; even after the
statutory termination of such a grant, the grantee will continue to
have the right to “utilize” the film made pursuant thereto. In such
circumstances, a grantee would not have the right after termination
to prepare a new motion picture based upon the same novel. 15

By the same logic, a software product may be sold following
the termination of an assignment or license to use some or all
of the code in the product. However, new derivative works—
perhaps including even minor updates—may no longer be
authorized. As a result, there can be significant impacts if a
work is characterized as an assignment or license of rights
instead of being a work for hire.

14. Id. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the
preparation after the termination of other derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.
Id. § 203(b)(1)
15. 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.02 [C] (2010) (footnotes
omitted).
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Where a person creates a wholly-owned business entity,
such as a personal corporation or LLC, the transfer of rights to
that entity on a work for hire basis will result in the same
changes to the author’s rights in the copyrighted work as if the
work was created as a work for hire for an unrelated employer.
As a result, the copyright term, the author’s termination rights,
and moral rights are affected, along with the identity of the
work’s author. A person who forms a personal corporation may
wish to include a written agreement between such person and
the entity, specifying that copyrighted works shall not be
treated as works for hire. 16 This may, however, affect the
commercial desirability of the entity’s work product to third
parties.
II. WHEN IS A WORK MADE FOR HIRE?
United States copyright law provides two very distinct
categories of work for hire. The first category regulates
traditional employment or agency relationships. “A ‘work made
for hire” is . . . a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment . . . .” 17 The second category of
work for hire deals with specially commissioned works. 18 To be
characterized as a work for hire under this category, the work
must fall into one or more of the nine statutorily enumerated
categories and the for-hire relationship must be evidenced by a
writing signed by both parties. 19 The application of the two
rules does not overlap and each should be analyzed separately.

16. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b).
17. Id. § 101.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 101. The statute defines a “work make for hire” as:
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the
purpose of the foregoing sentence, a ‘supplementary work’ is a work
prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another
author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating,
explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the
other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations,
maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer
material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an
‘instructional text’ is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities.
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For a work to be considered a work for hire of an entity, the
entity must be formed at the time the work is created. 20
A. TRADITIONAL EMPLOYEES UNDER WORK FOR HIRE
Under a regular employer/employee relationship, the
copyright in a work vests in the employer when the copyrighted
work is “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment.” 21 The law of agency applies to determine when a
person is considered an employee. 22 As the Supreme Court
explained in Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, “[t]o
determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court
first should ascertain, using principles of general common law
of agency, whether the work was prepared by an employee or
an independent contractor. After making this determination,
the court can apply the appropriate subsection of §101.” 23
The Supreme Court, in Committee for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, provided a non-exclusive list of factors
determining common law agency in the work for hire context,
often referred to as the “Reid factors.” 24 Interpreting these

20. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 825 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also
1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B] (2010); Billy-Bob Teeth,
Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2003) (corporation could not
establish ownership under work for hire theory because it did not exist when
author created work). But see Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc.,
617 F.3d 1146, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding harmless error the failure for
a one-person company to properly distinguish copyright ownership as vesting
in the company or its owner); Logicom Inclusive, Inc. v. W.P. Stewart & Co., 72
U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1639 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he annulment of Logicom’s
dissolution in May of 2003 should have retroactive effect, so that Logicom was
a legal entity capable of authoring and owning copyright of the two computer
programs at issue.”).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
22. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1989).
23. Id.
24. The list of factors considered by the Supreme Court include:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.
Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when
and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role
in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
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common law agency factors, the Second Circuit has suggested a
narrower group of factors:
[T]here are some factors that will be significant in virtually every
situation. These include: (1) the hiring party’s right to control the
manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision
of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5)
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party. These factors will almost always be relevant and
should be given more weight in the analysis, because they will usually
be highly probative of the true nature of the employment
relationship. 25

Similar factors have been applied in determining whether
an employment relationship exists for other purposes, such as
whether a sales representative is an employee for purposes of
bringing a Title VII sexual harassment claim against the hiring
party 26 or whether a medical doctor is an employee of his
practice group for purposes of taking a tax deduction for a
malpractice settlement 27
Of the Reid factors, the Second Circuit stated in 1992 that
employee benefits and tax treatment carried the greatest
weight. 28 This was because these factors were viewed as a
“virtual admission” by the hiring party as to the nature of the
relationship and because it would be inequitable to allow an
employer to treat the hired party as a contractor for benefits
and payroll taxes purposes while treating him or her as an
employee for copyright purposes. 29 The Eighth Circuit
reiterated this statement in 1999 in holding that a programmer
was an independent contractor largely because the hiring party
failed to extend him employee benefits or pay social security
taxes, even though other factors pointed to an employment

business . . . the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment
of the hired party. . . . No one of these factors is determinative.
Id. at 751–52 (internal citations omitted).
25. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
26. Russell v. BSN Med., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 465, 472 (W.D.N.C. 2010)
(citing the Reid factors in finding that a sales representative was an employee
for purposes of a Title VII sexual harassment claim).
27. Maimon v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-53, 55 (2009). Guidelines for
determining the existence of employment relationship for tax purposes are
based on common law definition of an employee. Id.
28. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863 (“The importance of these two factors is
underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that has applied the test
has found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring
party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”).
29. Id.
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relationship. 30
The Second Circuit has since moderated its position with
respect to Title VII cases, stating that “the ‘greatest emphasis’
should be placed on the first factor—that is, on the extent to
which the hiring party controls the ‘manner and means’ by
which the worker completes his or her assigned tasks.” 31 It is
too easy for the parties to manipulate workers compensation
arrangements thereby denying a worker the benefit of the antidiscrimination laws. 32 However, the court, in dicta, noted that
the “special consideration” accorded to benefits and tax
treatment may still make sense in the copyright work for hire
context because the copyright statute allows workers and
employers to allocate intellectual property rights by contract. 33
A recent traditional application of the Reid work for hire
factors to software created by a consultant was exemplified by
Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc. 34 The case for
the programmer, Rance Renfroe, being an independent
contractor was made easier by the fact that he worked through
a personal corporation he formed with his wife, Numbers
Licensing, LLC (Numbers). 35 In particular, Renfroe was found
not an employee of bVisual, a software development company,
because: (1) Numbers sent bVisual weekly invoices for
Renfroe’s work; (2) Numbers was responsible for Renfroe’s
payroll obligations, tax obligations, and employee benefits; (3)
Numbers supplied much of the equipment used, including
computers and other standard development tools; (4) although
one of the two founders of bVisual was heavily involved in some
aspects of the codes’ creation, he was not capable of detailed
code review; (5) Renfroe’s services were sought for a specific
purpose—specialized programming knowledge—and bVisual
had no right to assign additional projects to Renfroe, as it
30. Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting other
factors present including: that the programmer traveled with the company
president to clients, attended trade shows wearing a company uniform, his
hours were directed by the company, the parties had a six-year relationship,
and the programmer spent a significant amount of time working at the
company’s offices).
31. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 114
(2d Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 116, 117–118.
33. Id. at 117.
34. 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1252 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
35. Id. at 1251.
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would a regular salaried employee; (6) Renfroe wrote the code
primarily at Numbers’ offices at his own schedule with
discretion as to how he performed his work; (7) there were
instances where Renfroe denied being an employee, for
example, crossing out “employee” and writing “contractor” on
his employee handbook; and (8) communications between
Renfroe and the Company, such as those contained in
Company’s Confidentiality Agreement Renfroe signed, had a
“we” vs. “you” mentality. 36
III. TECHNOLOGY STARTUPS
Where technology startups are concerned, some recent
decisions have taken a more flexible approach to applying the
Reid factors to accommodate less traditional arrangements. 37
The tax and benefits treatment of the hired party did not
control the outcome. 38 As a result, whether a copyrighted work
will be owned by the controlling party has become more
unpredictable.
In particular, two recent cases, one which held for the
employer and the other for the programmer, recognized the
special circumstances that apply with respect to technology
startups and software developers. 39 The informality with which
these types of companies typically operate as to record-keeping,
the creative compensation arrangements utilized by new
ventures, as well as the fact that programmers can readily
work remotely with minimal direct oversight from nontechnical management, distinguishes technology startups in
the work for hire area.
A. JUSTMED V. BYCE
In JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, the Ninth Circuit favored the
employer over the programmer, finding that JustMed owned
the code at issue as a work for hire, in large measure because it
was a startup technology company. 40 The Ninth Circuit
36. Id. at 1251. This factor is somewhat questionable as many standard
form employee non-disclosure and invention assignment agreements use such
terminology as a colloquial alternative to legalese like, “party of the first part”
or “employer” and “employee.”
37. See JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010); Woods
v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 824 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
38. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1128.
39. See id.; Woods, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
40. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1126.
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affirmed the United States District of Idaho’s finding that the
programmer, Michael Byce, was an employee, not an
independent contractor of JustMed when he wrote the source
code for an artificial larynx. 41 As a result, the code was covered
by the work for hire doctrine and JustMed was considered the
copyright owner. 42
The facts of JustMed evidence a typical startup company
scenario: Michael Byce and Joel Just were brothers-in-law and
together they hatched the idea for the product. 43 They even got
a patent as co-inventors for the hands-free aspect of the
device. 44 Byce ceased work on the project for several years after
his wife died, but Just nonetheless offered Byce stock in
JustMed and a position on JustMed’s board. 45 In the meantime,
Just hired Jerome Leibler to develop a new hardware prototype
and write source code. 46 When Leibler moved to Kentucky,
Byce stepped back into the company and took over the
development of the source code and Leiblers’ compensation
package. 47 Byce worked at home in Idaho (JustMed’s
headquarters was in Oregon) and discussed the source code
with Just, but Just never personally edited the code. 48 Until
three months before the dispute, Byce was paid solely in stock,
but he never actually received any share certificates; they
accrued in a notebook maintained by Just. 49
Upon becoming aware of the disparity in share ownership
between himself and Just and Leibler, Byce attempted to
protect “his” intellectual property. 50 He changed the copyright
notice on the software to reflect his own name, not JustMed’s. 51
Two days before Just was scheduled to meet with a prospective
merger partner, Byce deleted the code from JustMed’s
computer, leaving JustMed with only an earlier version, which
41. Id. at 1128.
42. Id.
43. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, No. CV005-333-S-MHW, 2007 WL 2479887, at
*2 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2010).
44. Id.
45. Id. at *2–*3.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id. at *5.
49. Id. at *3, *6.
50. Id. at *6.
51. Id. at *5.
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did not run properly. 52 JustMed brought state law conversion
claims, but to prevail, it was required to prove that it owned
the code. 53 In the absence of any written agreement, JustMed’s
ownership claim rested solely on the application of the work for
hire doctrine. 54
If Byce was an employee of JustMed, then the preparation
of the code was within the scope of his employment. 55 The
argument turned on whether Byce was an employee or an
independent contractor. 56 Weighing in favor of Byce being an
employee were the following factors:
• The
duration
of
the
relationship
was
indefinite/permanent and Byce did not have a
defined end to his term. 57
• Byce did other work for JustMed besides
programming. He worked on the company’s
website, appeared at trade shows, and was a
director. He had a business card that said “Director
of Engineering.” 58
• JustMed hired Byce to replace Leibler, an
employee,
and
Byce
inherited
Leibler’s
compensation arrangements, namely a monthly
salary paid in stock, so Byce’s arrangements were
like other JustMed employees. 59
• Byce was paid monthly, not at the completion of his
specific project. 60
• Byce’s work was integral to JustMed’s primary
business—the development and marketing of the
device, which could not work without functioning
software; the continuous updating of this software
was too important to be left to an independent
contractor. 61
Weighing in favor of Byce’s treatment as an independent
contractor were the following factors:
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *1.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *1.
JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010).
JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *5, *9).
JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1126–27.
Id. at 1127.
Id.
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•

Byce was not paid a cash salary or benefits and was
never provided with actual share certificates. 62
• Until right before the lawsuit, JustMed did not
treat Byce as an employee for tax purposes 63 .
• Byce did not fill out employment forms. 64
• Byce worked independently with little direct
supervision from the company. 65
The Court gave the financial factors the short shrift in
light of JustMed’s status as a startup company and because
these factors did not bear directly on the substance of the
employment relationship, namely the right to control. 66 Just
testified that he did not think he had to comply with any
employment reporting requirements because Byce was an
“executive” and startup companies tend to pay employees in
stock which is never reported as income because it has
uncertain value. 67 The court concluded that:
JustMed’s treatment of Byce with regard to taxes, benefits, and
employment forms is more likely attributable to the start-up nature of
the business than to Byce’s alleged status as an independent
contractor. The indications are that other employees, for example
Liebler, were treated similarly. Insofar as JustMed did not comply
with federal and state employment or tax laws, we do not excuse its
actions, but in this context the remedy for these failings lies not with
denying the firm its intellectual property but with enforcing the
relevant laws.
As a small start-up company, JustMed conducted its business
more informally than an established enterprise might. This fact can
make it more difficult to decide whether a hired party is an employee
or an independent contractor, but it should not make the company
more susceptible to losing control over software integral to its
product. 68

The court also dismissed arguments that JustMed’s lack of
control over the manner and means by which Byce created the
source code—facts that Reid found most critical 69 —required a
finding that Byce was not an employee. 70 True, Byce worked at
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *3, *6.
Justmed, 600 F.3d at 1128.
Id.
See JustMed, 2007 WL 2479887, at *5.
JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1128.
Id. at 1121–22.
Id. at 1128.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1989).
JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1127.

2011]

WORK FOR HIRE

501

home in another state, set his own hours, and had little direct
supervision from JustMed. 71 But the Court noted that these
factors are not as important to a technology startup as to an
established company, 72 nor are they as relevant in the software
area. As an “inventive computer programmer,” Byce was
expected to work independently. 73 “The business model and
Byce’s duties [did] not require that the project be completed in
a particular manner or that Just continuously oversee Byce’s
work, so long as JustMed eventually found itself with a
marketable product.” 74 Email and phone input were
adequate. 75 The court concluded:
The nature of the business and the work [meant] that Byce’s ability to
set his own hours and [work] from home are not particularly relevant.
As a programmer, Byce . . . [can] ply his craft at any time and from
any place without any significant impairment to its quality or his
ability to meet JustMed’s needs. So although physical separation
between the hiring party and the [employer] is often relevant to
determining employment status, it is less germane in light of the kind
of work Byce was doing. 76

B. WOODS V. RESNICK
The case of Woods v. Resnick 77 followed on the heels of
JustMed v. Byce, but came out the opposite way, favoring the
programmer on somewhat similar facts. 78 Adam Resnick and
Erick Woods were equal partners in F&I Source LLC, a
software company that developed, maintained, and licensed a
web-based software program used in the auto finance
industry. 79 After examining the work for hire factors, the court
held that Woods, the partner who wrote the code, was not an
employee of F&I Source. 80 Thus, the absence of a signed
agreement from Woods assigning the copyright to Resnick or to
the company, along with a determination that joint ownership
71. Id. at 1122.
72. Id. at 1127.
73. Id.
74. Id. In this regard, the Court noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 220, cmt. e, (1958), explains that “[t]he custom of the community
as to the control ordinarily exercised in a particular occupation is of
importance.” Id. at 1127 n.7.
75. Id. at 1127.
76. Id. at 1127–28.
77. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 809 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
78. Id. at 813–16.
79. Id. at 812.
80. Id. at 824.
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was not proven, prompted the court to hold that Woods was the
program’s sole author. 81
The facts that led the court to find that Woods was not an
employee of F&I Source were as follows: (1) Resnick, a finance
director for various car dealerships, came up with an idea for a
customizable auto finance program; 82 (2) he developed a
working prototype consisting of spreadsheets, diagrams, and
notes, but did not have programming expertise; 83 (3)
accordingly, the source code for the program was produced
primarily, if not exclusively, by Woods, Resnick’s high school
friend; 84 (4) Woods worked full-time out of his home on his own
computer, borrowing some portions of the code from a project
he had worked on previously; 85 (5) Woods set his own hours
and worked independently without oversight from Resnick,
although the two would often exchange “task lists
and . . . emails identifying things that needed to be done to the
system”; 86 (6) Woods received a monthly draw against future
distributions of profits pursuant to a K-1 tax statement; 87
(7) other employees of F&I Source, handling sales and
marketing, received wages and W-2 statements from the
company; 88 (8) Woods’ home address was listed as the
company’s principal place of business. 89
Woods had conceded he was not an independent contractor,
leading Resnick to argue that he must be an employee. 90 Woods
countered that he was neither an independent contractor nor
an employee; rather he was “a 50% owner and member of F&I
Source, LLC.” 91
The District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
adopted Wood’s position. 92 As a co-owner of the company, the
Court stated that Woods did not have an agency relationship

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 826.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 814.
See id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
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with the company. 93 The Court reasoned further, “[u]nlike an
employee or independent contractor, an owner has an inherent
right to control the business. ‘[T]he attribute of co-ownership
distinguishes
a
partnership
from
a
mere
agency
relationship. . . . Ownership involves the power of ultimate
control.’” 94
From this foundation of mutual ownership and control by
the co-owners, the Court inferred that F&I Source did not meet
the control factors required by Reid:
As equal partners in the LLC, Woods and Resnick have equal voting
rights. There is no operating agreement or deadlock-breaking
agreement. As a result, unless both of them agree to a particular
action, deadlock ensues. In other words, the company does not have
the ability to compel either owner to take action. Under this scenario,
there is no basis for finding that Woods was an employee under the
control of F&I Source. 95

Of course, the rationale of co-ownership would have been less
compelling had the author owned less than fifty percent of the
hiring party’s equity.
Also supporting the Court’s conclusion that Woods’ code
was not a work for hire was the fact that the LLC asserting
ownership was not formed until after Woods had written the
program and assembled a product that was ready for
distribution to the public. 96 The Court dismissed pre-formation
activities as nothing “more than a working trade name that the
parties were using while they developed their project.” 97
Resnick failed to contend there had existed a general
partnership prior to the formation of the LLC, despite the
ongoing activities between the two parties. 98 Given the Court’s
view of the Reid control factors, favoring Woods, a
determination that the entity had existed as a general
partnership would likely have had little effect on the outcome,
93. Id. But see WIS. STAT. § 183.0301(1)(a) (2009) (“Each member is an
agent of the limited liability company, but not of the other members or any of
them, for the purpose of its business.”). The applicable Wisconsin statute
stands at odds with the assertion of the Court. At the partnership stage, the
result is the same. See WIS. STAT. § 178.06 (1) (2009) (“Every partner is an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business . . . .”).
94. Woods, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (quoting REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202(a), cmt. (1997)).
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 825.
97. Id.
98. Id. See WIS. STAT. § 178.03 (1) (2009) (“A partnership is an association
of 2 or more persons to carry on as co−owners [sic] a business for profit.”).
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but it would have at least precluded an independent basis for
denying work for hire ownership. 99
Moreover, the outcome would likely have been the same
even if the Court had not focused on the novel basis of company
co-ownership: Woods received no benefits, his compensation
came from company profits, and Woods worked out of his
house. 100 Almost every Reid factor weighed in Woods’ favor.
The Court, however, felt compelled to acknowledge the
recent Ninth Circuit decision in JustMed v Byce. It admitted
that the JustMed case stands for the proposition that “some of
the Reid factors tending to show that a party is an independent
contractor—such as the hiring party’s lack of day-to-day
oversight over the other party and failure to pay employment
benefits—have less weight given how technology start-ups
operate.” 101 Nevertheless, the Court distinguished JustMed on
its facts: in JustMed there was a corporation, not an LLC with
two equal members, and Byce was “hired” by JustMed to
replace an employee and was paid the same salary as that
employee. 102
While the Woods decision emphasizes the control factors
inherent in the jointly-owned LLC, the differing outcomes in
JustMed and Woods may also be explained by reference to the
equities. In JustMed, Byce attempted to derail the sale of the
company and extract leverage with respect to his stock
ownership by altering the copyright notice and deleting the
code. 103 The case arose as a conversion claim. 104 In addition,
the district court found that Byce was not a “credible witness”
concerning his compensation. 105 By contrast, in Woods the
copyright notice always said “Erick Woods,” the parties were
seeking a declaratory judgment, and Resnick’s testimony that
he wrote some of the code was called into question. 106

99. Cf. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146,
1156–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding harmless error the failure for a one-person
company to properly distinguish copyright ownership as vesting in the
company or its owner).
100. Woods 725 F. Supp. 2d at 814–15.
101. Id. at 824.
102. Id.at 824–25 (citations omitted).
103. JustMed Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 1123.
105. Id. at 1127.
106. Woods 725 F. Supp. 2d. at 812, 813, 815.
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IV. INTERPRETING WORK FOR HIRE CLAUSES
Even where an employment relationship is unquestionable,
copyright law and the work for hire doctrine can create
ambiguity as to the vesting of copyrights in new materials.
Thus, a written agreement may be used with employees to
clarify what work is to be vested in the employer as a work for
hire and what work is to be retained by the employee. 107 The
parties can agree whether a relationship is an employment
relationship or modify the work for hire provision’s
requirement that a particular work is within the scope of
employment. 108 Yet, even a work prepared by an employee will
not be regarded as a work for hire if it is not prepared in the
“scope of employment.” 109 “Therefore, an agreement between an
employer and employee whereby works prepared by the
employee that are not prepared within the scope of employment
are nevertheless deemed to be ‘works made for hire,’ will not in
itself, convert such works into the ‘for hire’ category.”110

107. See id. at 813 (describing such an agreement).
108. Arguably two parties cannot claim an employment relationship where
the common law agency factors clearly demonstrate that no such relationship
would exist. This was the reason the music industry attempted to include
sound recordings under the category of specially commissioned works, an
amendment which was once incorporated as a technical correction to the
Copyright Act, but then retroactively withdrawn. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work
made for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained
in section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of
Public Law 106-113, nor the deletion of the words added by that
amendment—
(A) shall be considered or otherwise given any legal significance, or
(B) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or
disapproval of, or acquiescence in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph (2) shall be
interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made For Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the
Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of
1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, were
never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by
the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.
Id. So a copyright assignment clause which states that “the parties hereby
recognize that Author hereunder is an employee for purposes of copyright but
for no other purpose (including inter alia, tax and labor laws) . . .” would likely
be disregarded by the fact-finder if the remaining Reid factors dictated an
independent contractor relationship. To do otherwise would circumvent the
limitations on specially commissioned works embodied in the Copyright Act.
109. 5 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1][b][ii] (2010).
110. Id.
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A. MATTEL INC. V. MGA ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
In the case of an express employment agreement,
uncertainty can exist based on the interpretation of the
contractual terms. In Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the impact of a written
employment agreement used to augment the work for hire
doctrine. 111 The appeal focused on the written agreement
between a Mattel employee, Carter Bryant, and Mattel. 112
“Bryant worked in the ‘Barbie Collectibles’ department [of
Mattel], where he designed fashion and hair styles for high-end
Barbie dolls intended more for accumulation than for play.” 113
During the time period that Bryant was employed at Mattel, he
created sketches, a crude mock-up, and had the ideas for
several doll names, all of which he pitched to Mattel’s
competitor, MGA. 114 Bryant subsequently left Mattel for a
consulting arrangement with MGA to work on the development
of the Bratz line. 115 A flurry of lawsuits by Mattel followed,
asserting that it was the owner of the intellectual property
rights in the Bratz dolls, including the doll names. 116
Bryant’s employment contract included the following
somewhat standard language:
I agree to communicate to the Company as promptly and fully as
practicable all inventions (as defined below) conceived or reduced to
practice by me (alone or jointly by others) at any time during my
employment by the Company. I hereby assign to the Company . . . all
my right, title and interest in such inventions, and all my right, title
and interest in any patents, copyrights, patent applications or
copyright applications based thereon. 117

The contract further specified that, “the term ‘inventions’
includes, but is not limited to, all discoveries, improvements,
processes, developments, designs, know-how, data computer
programs
and
formulae,
whether
patentable
or
unpatentable.” 118
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 910.
Id. at 907.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 909 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The language of Bryant’s employment contract did not
expressly cover “ideas.” 119 It did, however, apply to inventions
“conceived as well as those reduced to practice,” suggesting that
the assignment governed works that were not yet fixed. 120 The
District Court for the Central District of California found the
provisions of Bryant’s employment contract covered ideas such
as those involving the doll names “Bratz” and “Jade” as a
matter of law. 121 The Ninth Circuit held that this finding
should have been submitted to the jury based on extrinsic
evidence, including reference to other Mattel employee
contracts that included “ideas,” and the common perceptions in
the design industry. 122
Yet, even if Bryant’s employment contract covered his
ideas, other contractual interpretation issues remained. The
agreement specified that all inventions conceived or reduced to
practice “at any time during my employment” were assigned to
Mattel. 123 The sketches and sculpt clearly qualified as
“inventions”. 124 However, the employment contract did not
clarify whether “during my employment” was limited to
Bryant’s actual working hours or covered the entire period or
term of his employment. 125 In addition, the employment
contract expressly excepted inventions that qualify under the

119. Id.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such works could include
“know-how” and “discoveries.”
121. Id. at 909.
122. Id. at 910.
At various stages of litigation, the parties introduced such evidence
supporting their respective interpretations of ‘inventions.’ Contracts
Mattel drafted for other employees, for example, expressly assigned
their ‘ideas’’ as well as their ‘inventions.’ This tends to show that the
term ‘inventions’ alone doesn’t include ideas. On the other hand, a
Mattel executive claimed during her deposition that it was common
knowledge in the design industry that terms like ‘invention’ and
‘design’ did include employee ideas. Because the district court
concluded that the language of the contract was clear, it didn’t
consider the extrinsic evidence the parties presented. Even if it had, it
may not have been able to resolve the meaning of ‘inventions.’ If the
meaning turns in part on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic
evidence, a properly instructed jury should have decided the issue.
Id.
123. Id. at 909.
124. Id. at 911.
125. See id. at 913 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate
because there was ample reasoning to read the agreement as covering and not
covering non-working hours).
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provisions of the California Labor Code section 2870. 126 This
section limits the extent to which an employer can use an
employment agreement to assign inventions that may be
outside the scope of employment:
(a) Any provision in an employment agreement which provides that
an employee shall assign, or offer to assign, any of his or her rights in
an invention to his or her employer shall not apply to an invention
that the employee developed entirely on his or her own time without
using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret
information except for those inventions that either:
(1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice of the
invention to the employer’s business, or actual or demonstrably
anticipated research or development of the employer; or
(2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the
employer. 127

The two exceptions in section 2870 reasonably approximate the
“scope of employment” prong of the work for hire doctrine, as
applied to the state law of assignment of employee work
product. 128
The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence conflicted as to
the interpretation of the phrase “at any time during my
employment.” 129 One Mattel employee testified that
“everything I did while at the company belonged to [it],” while
another employee testified that “it was common knowledge that
a lot of people . . . moonlight[ed] . . . which wasn’t a problem if it
was on their own time, and at their own house.” 130 The Ninth
Circuit held that the issue (as to whether Bryant’s contract
covered his work on Bratz) should have been submitted to the
jury under instructions to “determine (1) whether Bryant’s

126. Id. at 912 n.5.
127. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (a) (West 2010).
128. Id. The Section concludes by stating, “(b) To the extent a provision in
an employment agreement purports to require an employee to assign an
invention otherwise excluded from being required to be assigned under
subdivision (a), the provision is against the public policy of this state and is
unenforceable.” Id. Other states with similar statues limiting the scope of
employee invention assignment agreements are Delaware (DEL CODE ANN.
LABOR 19, § 805 (West 2011)); Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1060/2
(WEST 2011)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-130 (West 2010)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West 2010)); North Carolina (N. C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 66-57.1 (West 2010)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3 (West 2010));
and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140 (West 2010)), among
others.
129. Mattel, 616 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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agreement assigned works created outside the scope of his
employment at Mattel, and (2) whether Bryant’s creation of the
Bratz sketches and sculpt was outside the scope of his
employment.” 131
Mattel also argued that the juxtaposition of the
employment agreement and the work for hire doctrine argued
in favor of a broad interpretation of the agreement. Under the
Copyright Act, employers are the authors of works made for
hire under; as such, “the agreement must cover works made
outside the scope of employment.” 132 If this were not the case
employees would be assigning to their employer works, which
the employer already owned. 133 The court dismissed this
argument on the grounds that the contract provided Mattel
additional rights by covering more than just copyrightable
works and the contract could “also be enforced in state court,
whereas Copyright Act claims must be heard in federal
court.” 134
The portion of Bryant’s contract quoted by the Ninth
Circuit did not specify Bryant’s employment obligations or his
duties. Nothing in the facts suggested that Bryant was
employed to develop new dolls to compete with or complement
Barbie Dolls or other Mattel products. 135 If Bryant’s
employment contract had provided that all doll and toy designs
were part of his duties for Mattel, then the determination
might have been in Mattel’s favor. 136 Likewise, had the
131. Id. at 913. To the extent a contract specifically includes all ideas that
are reduced to practice or otherwise fixed during the time of employment, they
are within the California Labor Code exception for works that “[r]elate at the
time of conception or reduction to practice of the invention to the employer’s
business, or actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development of
the employer.”
132

Id. at 912 n.7.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Evidence supports the MGA contention that it investigated the right
of Bryant to develop Bratz and concluded the materials were created outside
the scope of Bryant’s employment at Mattel. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t,
Inc., No. CV 04-9049, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102461, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
22, 2010) (MGA’s attorney emailed Carter’s attorney asking “specifically about
the Mattel issue and she said she reviewed the chronology of the creation of
this design and is satisfied that Carter created it outside the scope of his
employment at Mattel.”).
136. The Ninth Circuit states that, on remand, Mattel might well convince
a properly instructed jury that Bryant’s preliminary Bratz sketches and sculpt
were created within the scope of his employment at Mattel. Mattel, Inc. v.
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contract between Mattel and Bryant specified that any new
products involving dolls or toys were developed for the benefit
of Mattel, then any ambiguity might also have been resolved. 137
The nature of the Bratz dispute reinforces the need to
clarify the scope of an employee’s responsibility. In many large
corporations however, most employee work for hire invention
assignment agreements are standard forms that are not
tailored to any particular employee’s job duties. 138 To
determine whether an employee’s work is produced in the scope
of employment, the court may look at the employee’s job
description. 139 Such a description can be more influential as to
the scope of employment than whether the work was created
during working hours or on the employer’s premises.
In Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, John Marshall, a staff
scientist for Miles Laboratories (Miles), was held to have
authored a research paper within the scope of his employment
because his job description as “Director of Enzyme Research
and Development” was to “develop, summarize and report
information about advances in technologies of interest” and
maintain an awareness of the latest scientific advances in his
specialty. 140
Marshall claimed that the research paper was not made
within the scope of his employment and therefore, Miles did not
hold the copyright. Marshall testified that “his contributions to
MGA Entm’t, Inc., Nos. 09-5673, 09-55812, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24150, at
*19 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2010.)
137. On remand, the jury reached a verdict largely favoring MGA. The jury
held, among other things, that Mattel did not prove that it owned the name or
the concept for the Bratz line of dolls. See Mattel Stole MGA's Bratz Trade
360
(April
21,
2011),
Secrets,
Jury
Says,
LAW
http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/240538/mattel-stole-mga-s-bratztrade-secrets-jury-says.
138. See, e.g., Work-For-Hire Agreement, CREATIVE BUS. SOLUTIONS,
http://www.creativebusiness.com/pdf_free/CBworkforhire.pdf (last visited Apr.
4, 2011).
139. Marshall v. Miles Labs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(demonstrating a court looking to an employee’s job description to determine
whether his actions were within the scope of his employment).
140. Id. at 1327, 1330 (citations omitted). Marshall had the following
language in his employment contract: “All discoveries or inventions, whether
patentable or not, conceived jointly or solely by the EMPLOYEE during the
period of employment shall become the property of the COMPANY without
additional compensation or consideration.” Id. at 1330 n.2. Because the
contract was allegedly signed by Marshall under duress, the court did not give
it weight when determining the outcome of the case. Id.
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the article were not prepared while he was at his office at
Miles, that Miles never specifically instructed him to write the
article, and he was never given additional consideration for the
article.” 141 The U.S. District Court for the District of Indiana
rejected Marshall’s assertions, finding:
Neither case law nor the legislative history suggests that a person can
avoid the ‘work made for hire’ doctrine merely by preparing the work
during non-working hours or in a facility not controlled by the
employer. The mere fact that preparations were done outside an
employee’s office or normal working hours does not remove such
preparations from the scope of employment. 142

Since the article otherwise qualified as within the scope of
Marshall’s employment, it was deemed a work for hire of
Miles. 143
In sum, being an employee does not transfer to the
employer every copyrighted work developed. Only those works
reasonably related to the scope of the employment will vest in
the employer. If the copyrighted materials reflect the type of
work typical for that employee, then the work for hire doctrine
can extend to those works without regard to whether the actual
fixation occurred at home or in the office.
V. SPECIALLY COMMISSIONED WORKS
The second category of works made for hire applies to
specifically commissioned works. For these works, the status of
the employee is not relevant. Instead, the work must fall into
one of nine categories enumerated under the Copyright Act,
and must be transferred to the hiring party in a writing signed
by both the person commissioning the work and by the person
who prepared the work pursuant to said commission. 144 If both
requirements are met, the copyright vests in the hiring party
as the author. 145
The nine categories of work that are eligible to be specially
commissioned works are works used “as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,

141. Id. at 1330.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1331; see also 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][b][i] (2010).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
145. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER THE 1976
COPYRIGHT ACT (2010).
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as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas.” 146
Motion pictures are a prime example, demonstrating the
need for extending the work for hire doctrine to specially
commissioned works because the screenwriter, director, set
designer, cinematographer, and even the actors are not
generally employees, but might be contributing copyrighted
material to the final product. Motion picture companies
typically hire parties using written contracts that specify that
the work is done as a specially commissioned work; as a result,
the copyright in all elements of the movie vests exclusively in
the company. 147
Similar logistical demands apply to software development
and the creation of sophisticated videogames and online
content. Software has been argued to be within the nine
categories of specially commissioned works either as a part of

146. 17 U.S.C. § 101. To better understand the nine categories of specially
commissioned works, the statute definitions provide additional information,
for example:
“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of related
images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of
machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied. . . .
A “collective work” is a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole. . . .
A “compilation” is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship. The term “compilation” includes
collective works. . . .
[A] ‘supplementary work’ is a work prepared for a publication as a
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of
introducing,
concluding,
illustrating,
explaining,
revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables,
editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests,
bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes; and an “instructional text” is
a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with
the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. . . .
Id.
147. See Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the
Digital Personal of the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1165, 1175–77 (2001).
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collective work in the system as a whole 148 or because the nonliteral elements of the program constitute a compilation. 149
Not just any writing will qualify as sufficient to make a
specially-commissioned work a work for hire. In some decisions,
a work for hire agreement providing that a work is a specially
commissioned work must expressly include the terms “workfor-hire” or “specially commissioned work.” 150 Without these
express terms, the contract may not be more than an
assignment of copyright. 151 In other decisions, “talismanic
words” are not required so long as the intent of the parties to
enter into a work for hire relationship is sufficiently expressed
in the written agreement. 152 Thus, it is always preferable to
use these terms if they appropriately express the intent of the
parties. Even an assignment of “all right, title and interest”
does not intuitively suggest that more than an assignment of
the copyright is intended. 153 In Numbers Licensing, LLC v.
bVisual USA, Inc., a copyright notice embedded in the source
code that said “Numbers Consulting for bVisual, copyright,”
was not sufficient to constitute a written agreement that the
program was a work for hire. 154 The Court held this to be
inconsistent with Congressional intent to have certainty in
copyright ownership at the outset and, further, that the code
entries lacked the parties’ signatures. 155
A. LOGICOM INCLUSIVE, INC. V. W.P. STEWART & CO.
The case of Logicom Inclusive, Inc. v. W.P. Stewart & Co.
provides a veritable checklist of what to do in the context of
specially-commissioned software, namely: (1) make sure that
contractors working for another contractor create works for
hire for their employer; (2) make sure that a written
148. Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245,
1253 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
149. Logicom Inclusive v. W.P. Stewart & Co., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1640
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
150. Id. at 1641 (citing Armento v. Laser Image, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 719, 730
(W.D.N.C. 1996) (“The Second Circuit has indicated that the omission [of the
words ‘work for hire’] is fatal.”)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1641.
153. Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“[assignment] of all right, title and interest” was not sufficient to evidence a
work for hire relationship).
154. Numbers, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
155. Id.
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instrument mentions “specially-commissioned works” and/or
“work for hire;” (3) make sure that the entity claiming to be the
author of the copyrighted work is in good standing when the
work is created; and (4) a copyright registration only affords a
presumption of validity if it is timely filed. 156
The defendant in Logicom, W.P. Stewart & Co. (WPS), was
a global investment advisor and financial services firm that
hired Logicom in 1985 to create software for a number of
programs involving the core financial services of WPS. 157
Logicom created the two copyrighted works at issue in 1995. 158
Relations deteriorated over attempts to enter into a written
agreement and, in early 2003, Logicom’s ongoing services were
terminated. 159 WPS continued to modify the software using its
own employees and independent contractors. 160 Logicom sued
for copyright infringement for the unauthorized creation of
derivative works. 161
The defense by WPS raised a number of critical points.
First, WPS challenged Logicom’s ownership of the software
created by WPS’s own independent contractors. 162 To prevail,
the court had to first determine that the software was covered
under the statutory definition of a specially commissioned
work. 163 As the Logicom Court recognized, “[c]omputer
program” is not expressly listed as one of the nine categories of
specially commissioned works under § 101 of the Copyright
Act. 164 “However, the case law makes clear that the nonliteral
elements of a computer program are properly considered a
‘compilation’ insofar as the concepts of selection, arrangement
and organization, central to the compilation doctrine, are
included in the analysis of a computer program’s structure.” 165
As a result, the creation of software is within the nine

156. See 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 1632 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
157. Id. at 1634–35.
158. Id. at 1635.
159. Id.
160. Id.at 1636.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1639.
163. Id. at 1640.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
711–12 (2d Cir. 1992); Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. Supp.
1042, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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enumerated categories of works that may be specially
commissioned.
Secondly, for the work to be considered a work for hire,
“the parties [must] expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire.” 166 The contract signed by the parties in Logicom
stated that “[w]ork [p]roduct created by [c]onsultant . . . shall
be the sole property of Company for the sole use of the
Company and its clients.” 167 Rather than following this narrow
interpretation, in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Dumas, 168 the
judge followed the Ninth Circuit precedent to find the
contractual language was sufficient. 169 This was a generous
reading in favor of the hiring party, as courts may be reluctant
to find work for hire when the plaintiff is an independent
contractor claiming not to have agreed to be stripped of
statutory copyright protections through vague or ambiguous
language. Therefore, although the Logicom court found for
WPS, it also serves as a warning regarding the need to use
statutory terms in the specially commissioned agreement.
A third warning also flows from Logicom regarding the
registration of copyright for startups utilizing software and
similar works. A valid copyright registration is a prerequisite to
litigation of a copyright infringement claim by a U.S. author. 170
Without at least an application pending for registration, there
can be no copyright action. 171
The defendant claimed the copyright registration was not
valid because the employer firm was not in existence at the
time of registration or the filing of the suit. 172 Logicom had
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
167. Logicom Inclusive, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1641 (5th alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
168. 53 F.3d 549, 565 (2d Cir. 1995).
169. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1642 (citing Warren v. Fox Family
Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no
requirement, either in the [Copyright] Act or the caselaw, that work-for-hire
contracts include any specific wording.”)); See generally Playboy, 53 F.3d at
551–65.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (“[N]o action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration
or registration of the copyright claim has been made. . . .”).
171. If the alleged copyright owner meets the notice, deposit and
registration application process, then the suit can proceed even if the
copyright office refuses to register the work. See 2 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 7.18 (2010).
172. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638.
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been lawfully formed in 1990, but allowed its corporate status
to lapse in 1994. 173 Defendants claimed that “because the
corporation had been dissolved, Logicom could not have been
the proper ‘author’ of the two computer programs [written in
1995], as is attested in the certificates of registration [issued in
2002].” 174 In 2003, Logicom annulled the dissolution, returning
to good standing as a New York corporation. 175 The Logicom
court relied on the good faith but mistaken belief that a viable
corporation existed and the annulment of the dissolution—
rather than the formation of another entity—to find the
copyright registration was valid. 176
It is quite common for startup businesses to begin
operating before their organizational formalities are completed;
even so, the Copyright Act is not generally forgiving to
inaccurate registrations. Section 411(b)(b)(1) provides:
A certificate of registration satisfies the requirements of this section
and section 412, regardless of whether the certificate contains any
inaccurate information, unless—
(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for
copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and
(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused
the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration. 177

As to prong (A), the applicant’s good faith belief that Logicom
continued
to
operate
protected
the
registration. 178
Nevertheless, Logicom’s copyright application should have been
invalid under prong (B) because the Copyright Office will
typically refuse registration when the application is made by an
unauthorized applicant. By accepting the good faith assertion
regarding the corporate status, the Logicom court saved the
copyright. 179 The inaccuracy caused by registering the
copyright in a non-existent corporation was not fatal in this
case, but it certainly has the potential to undermine the
validity of the registration or the authority of the entity to
enter into the work for hire agreement. 180
173. Id. at 1636.
174. Id. at 1638.
175. Id. at 1635.
176. Id. at 1638–39.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2006).
178. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638–39.
179. Id. at 1639.
180. The more likely rationale was that during the period when Logicom
was operating without recognition as a lawful corporation, it was in fact a
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Finally, the Logicom decision grappled with the validity of
the copyright registration itself. The registration was filed
December 20, 2002 for a work listed as being created in
1995. 181 A copyright registration made before or within five
years after the first publication of a work is prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in
the related Certificate of Registration. 182 Since the work in this
case was a custom software package installed for the benefit of
WPS and sold to no other parties, the court correctly
determined the software was unpublished. Courts have not
provided much guidance regarding the presumption that
should be afforded to information contained in copyright
registration certificates with respect to unpublished works.
Looking to the language of the statute, courts generally find
that the copyright is “presumptively valid” by implication
because the work is unpublished. 183
The Logicom court relied on a different interpretation of
the statute to provide the presumption of validity to the
certificate of registration. It held that “[t]he statute requires
that a court begin its countdown five years after first
publication of a copyrightable work.” 184 This is an alternative
reading of the language “before or within five years after first
publication of the work.” 185 The Logicom interpretation
suggests that the presumption is available only if the work is
registered within five years after its publication and essentially
ignores the word “before.” Factually, the registration for the
unpublished work was seven years after its creation, therefore,
no presumption of validity was available. 186 While this is likely
the wrong result, a court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act
general partnership. As a general partnership, it would have continued to
have the authority to enter into the work for hire agreement and register the
copyright.
181. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1637.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (c).
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the
certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a
registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp.
614, 621 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
184. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638 (emphasis added).
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
186. Logicom, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638.
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can sometimes be unpredictable.
What makes this result more understandable in the
context of Logicom are the changes that occurred in the
computer programs during the seven years between their first
creation and their alleged infringement. As testified, the work
was subject to “major overhauls.” 187 As a result, the registered
work may not have borne any reasonable resemblance to the
work that was infringed. A registration should be sufficient to
protect an infringement of a derivative work, except when only
the newly added material is infringed. In those cases, the
original registration will not provide a basis for the copyright
infringement claim because it does not cover the revisions at
issue. 188
In sum, when addressing the categories of work available
for specially-commissioned status, the language in the work for
hire agreement, the ownership of copyright by a dissolved
corporation, and the effect of delay in obtaining registration,
the Logicom dispute provides a roadmap for avoiding the
contractual pitfalls of work for hire in the case of specially
commissioned works.
VI. NON-APPLICABILITY OF WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
A. BACK-UP ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT
While reliance on the work for hire doctrine is a critical
part of planning for United States companies, this doctrine is
not recognized in Europe and many other jurisdictions. 189
Moreover, there is ambiguity as to the works that fall within
the nine types of works that can be specially-commissioned
under the work for hire doctrine, whether the creator is an
employee, and whether the work was created in the scope of
employment. As a result, companies would be well advised to
include saving language in their work for hire agreements,
specifying that the copyright in any work that is not recognized
under the law as a work for hire is treated by the parties as
assigned to the employer. An example of such a saving clause
187. Id. at 1637.
188. See H. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976).
189. The conflicts of law issues can become quite complex when the
employee is located in a foreign jurisdiction that does not recognize the work
for hire doctrine. See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1][c]
(2010).
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is: “to the extent the work created by contractor/employee in
the scope of any [engagement/employment] is not recognized as
a work for hire as a matter of law, the contractor/employee
hereby assigns any and all copyright in such works to
employer.” Such an assignment provision will serve to transfer
ownership to the employer, “but will not trigger the other legal
benefits to the employer that flow from the status of a ‘for-hire’
work.” 190
A written transfer of copyright must meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act. 191 It must be “an
instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer . . . in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” 192 “To be
valid [as] an assignment under §204(a) [of the Copyright Act,
an assignment] must ‘clearly identify the deal and its basic
parameters.’” 193 In Playboy Enterprises v. Dumas, the Second
Circuit refused to consider as an assignment of copyright a
legend on the back of a check on which payee assigned “all
right title and interest” in the described painting because it did
not mention the word “copyright” and evidence was conflicted
as to whether the parties intended to transfer the copyright or
only a one-time reproduction right. 194
Copyright assignment requirements are not satisfied by
contracts with third parties. 195 Recently, in Woods v. Resnick, a
court pointed out that it was not sufficient to assign a copyright
that Woods, the author of the code, signed (on behalf of F&I
Source) a service agreement with a third party that reserved
rights in the code to F&I Source. 196 Nor was it sufficient that
the terms and conditions on F&I Source’s website, also drafted
by Woods, stated that F&I Source was the sole and exclusive
owner of the copyrights on the website. 197 While these were
“circumstantial admissions,” they did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for the assignment of copyright from Woods to

190. Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][ii].
191. 17 U.S.C. §204(a) (2006).
192. Id.
193. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 826 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing
Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
2009)).
194. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir. 1995).
195. See, e.g., Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 826.
196. Id. at 825–26.
197. Id. at 826.
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F&I Source. 198 “Instead, the documents confirm[ed] the rights
that exist between F&I Source and third parties.” 199 Said the
court: “[T]he written documents are not between Woods and
F&I Source and they do not contain any terms clearly
identifying the terms of any transfer deal between the two.” 200
The purpose of the signed writing requirement is “to
ensure that the copyright owner deliberately transfers its
ownership interest and that the owner does so in way that
provides the parties with a clear guide to their rights and
responsibilities.” 201 The organizational documents in a limited
liability company 202 or a partnership 203 do not necessarily
satisfy this obligation. The assignment can be in any
agreement signed by the parties, but it must be explicit as to
the copyright interests being transferred and not merely
implied by the relationship of the parties. 204
B. JOINT AUTHORSHIP
Even where work for hire status is applicable to a work,
there remains an additional copyright doctrine that can come
into play. Rather than characterizing the relationship as
employer/employee, a hiring party desiring to retain rights in
the copyright might claim the work was jointly authored by the
individual author and the hiring party.
A work by more than one author is described by the statute
as a “joint work.” 205 “A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.” 206 In a joint work, the co-authors are co-owners of the
copyright in the work and hold undivided interests in the work,
despite any differences in each other’s contribution. 207 Each

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
202. Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 824.
203. Price v. Fox Entm’t Grp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
204. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006). See, e.g.¸ Woods, 725 F. Supp. at 826.
205. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
206. Id.
207. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). See Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors
Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010)
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joint author “has the right to use or to license the use of the
work, subject to an accounting to the other co-[authors] for any
profits.” 208 Thus, even a person whose contribution is relatively
minor enjoys a significant benefit, so long as he is deemed a
joint author. Joint authors receive the benefit of copyright
protection for seventy years following the death of the last
surviving author. 209
Merely because two people collaborate to create a work
does not make them joint authors. 210 The key to joint
authorship is the intent of the authors at the time the work is
created to merge their efforts into one work. 211 The law does
not require a signed written agreement to establish joint
authorship, although such an agreement would eliminate most
related controversies. 212
In addition, most courts require that each participant
contribute copyrightable expressions to the work, not just
ideas. 213 This requires that both authors actually write dialog,
narration, music, or, in the case of software, lines of code. Thus,
precluding joint authorship where one participant merely
provides concepts or suggestions. 214 Courts have embraced this
rule in order to prevent the absurd result that the work was
protected by copyright even though each author’s contribution
was insufficient to be protected alone. 215 Because the threshold
(holding that a joint work was created where one songwriter contributed only
10% of the lyrics, but they were significant to the song’s commercial viability.)
208. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2006). If one of the joint authors is an entity, then
the copyright term will be based on work for hire measures of 95 years from
publication or 120 from creation, whichever is less. Id. § 302(c).
210. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990).
211. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
212. For example, a written agreement assigning a treatment for a motion
picture defeated a claim that the motion picture itself was a joint work.
Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 964 (9th Cir.
2008).
213. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 521.
214. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000);
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199–205 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067–72 (7th Cir. 1994).
215. Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 361
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010). But see Gaiman v.
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004). Here the court did not
require each co-author of a comic book character to contribute an
independently fixed and copyrightable component because “where two or more
people set out to create a character jointly in such mixed media as comic books
and motion pictures and succeed in creating a copyrightable character, it
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for copyright protection is rather low, the contribution of
expression requirement is usually not too difficult to achieve.
216

With respect to software, in Woods v. Resnick, Resnick
raised the theory that he and Woods were joint authors of the
auto finance program as an alternative to his work for hire
claim. 217 Nevertheless, the fact that Resnick came up with the
idea for the dealer finance system and provided directions to
Woods regarding what the program should do and how it
should do it was not enough to make him a co-author. 218 As to
Resnick’s other contributions: (1) there was insufficient proof
that he wrote any lines of code; (2) the incorporation of
Resnick’s finance formulas on excel spreadsheets did not add
original copyrightable content, but common ideas; and (3)
Resnick’s mock-ups of screen displays did not contain
independently copyrightable expression as they were nearly
identical to other F&I reports on the market since 1999. 219
Joint authorship is not necessarily desirable as a
commercial matter. Either author can independently exploit
the work, so that the authors can become competitors, yet
neither one can grant exclusive rights to a third party without
the participation of the other joint owner. 220 In addition, the
requirement to account for profits has had limited
interpretation. 221 In the entertainment area, the calculation of
profits can be quite complex. 222 Where partners intend to be or
are aware that they are joint authors, they often enter into a
written agreement waiving the accounting for profits and
would be paradoxical if[,] though the result of their joint labors had more than
enough originality and creativity to be copyrightable, no one could claim
copyright.” Id.
216. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(“The sine qua non of copyright is originality. . . . To be sure, the requisite level
of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”).
217. Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812–13 (W.D. Wis. 2010).
218. Id. at 825 (citing Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 658 (“[P]erson who contributes
merely non-expressive elements to a work, such as ideas, suggestions[,] or
editorial changes, is not an ‘author’”)).
219. Id. at 819–24.
220. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 100 (2nd Cir. 2007) ([I]n order to convey
exclusive rights, all co-owners must agree to convey their shares of the same
right).
221. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
222. Davis, 505 F.3d at 106 (discussing the difficult process of determining
damages relating to copyright infringement in the music industry).
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setting out parameters for licensing their rights.
VII. IMPLIED LICENSE
If the hiring party fails to prove a work for hire
arrangement, an assignment of copyright, or joint authorship,
it still has one last arrow in its quiver to obtain rights in the
copyrighted work. It can assert that it has an implied
license. 223 Such a license would be non-exclusive because the
Copyright Act requires that exclusive licenses, a form of
transfer of copyright ownership, be in writing and signed by the
owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized
agent. 224 Non-exclusive licenses can be granted orally or by
implication. 225 Where consideration has been paid for the
creation of the work, the license may be found to be
irrevocable. 226
Finding an implied license is not automatic. It requires a
determination that “1) a person (the licensee) request[ed] the
creation of a work, 2) the creator (the licensor) ma[de] that
particular work and deliver[ed] it to the licensee who requested
it, and 3)the licensor intend[ed] that the licensee-requestor
copy and distribute his work.” 227 The intent requirement is
itself broken out into a three-prong test, i.e., “(1) whether the
parties were engaged in a short-term discrete transaction as
opposed to an ongoing relationship; (2) whether the creator
utilized written contracts . . . providing that copyrighted
materials could only be used with the creator’s future
involvement or express permission; and (3) whether the
creator’s conduct during the creation or delivery of the
copyrighted material indicated that use of the material without
the creator’s involvement or consent was permissible.” 228
In Numbers Licensing, LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., a
software development company argued for an implied license
223. Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d. 748, 754–55 (9th Cir.
2008).
224. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “Transfer of Copyright
Ownership” to include an “exclusive license”); 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006)
(requirements for transfer of copyright ownership include a signed writing).
225. Asset, 542 F.3d at 754.
226. Id. at 757; see also 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
10.02[B][5] (2010).
227. Numbers Licensing LLC v. bVisual USA, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1245,
1252 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (citing Asset, 542 F.3d at 754–55).
228. Asset., 542 F.3d at 756 (citing Danielson v. Winchester-Conant, 322
F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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after it failed to establish that a program created by Rand
Renfroe through his personal corporation, Numbers, was a
work for hire. 229 The court held that bVisual obtained an
implied license to continue using the system’s source code. 230
The parties’ failure to have a written agreement contradicting a
license, the fact that Numbers did not, despite numerous
opportunities, deny a license until the relationship ended, that
Numbers inserted a copyright notice in the code that said
“Numbers Consulting for bVisual, copyright,” and that
Numbers was paid a substantial sum in both money and stock
for the delivery of the code all played into the court’s
decision. 231 The court summed it up thusly, “When a license
has not been denied and substantial sums of money are paid for
the copyrighted work, the absence of a licensing agreement
supports the finding of an implied license.” 232
Where the facts establishing work for hire and joint work
are controversial and, therefore, not susceptible to resolution
on a preliminary motion, an implied license provides the
aggrieved party continued access to the software, pending final
resolution of the other claims. Credit Bureau Connection Inc. v.
Pardini presents such a case. 233 In Pardini, the parties were
equal stockholders of Credit Bureau Connection (CBC), a joint
venture company undertaking the development and marketing
of finance and insurance software for automobile
dealerships. 234 One stockholder asserted that CBC owned the
program as a work for hire because, among other things, CBC
reimbursed the cost of the programming supervisor and his
assistants and supplied office space and some of the
development tools. 235 The other stockholder, Data Consultants,
argued that the programmers were its own employees and
received
employment
benefits
directly
from
Data
Consultants. 236
The District Court for the Central District of California
229. Numbers, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
230. Id. at 1254.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1253.
233. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
234. Id. at 1110.
235. Id. at 1117.
236. Id. at 1117–18.
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held that CBC did not carry its burden to prove that the
programmers were employees of CBC or that the programming
supervisor and CBC made a jointly-authored work. 237 However,
CBC was successful in establishing that it had an implied
license. 238 The software was delivered to CBC for its use; and,
for nearly three years, CBC marketed the program under its
own name with unlimited use and access thereto, working with
the programmers to modify it throughout that time period. 239
The terms of an implied license to software, such as
whether the license includes the source code, the right to
modify it, and even the duration of the license, may be
contested. In Pardini, the license was found to include the right
to modify the code, was not limited to existing customers, and,
because the hiring party paid money towards the creation of
the software, the license was irrevocable. 240 In Asset Marketing
Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, the Ninth Circuit found that the
implied license included the source code because the author
delivered it to Asset Marketing Systems (AMS), the hiring
party, by installing and storing it on AMS’s computer. 241 The
court also found support for AMS’s right to modify the code by
reference to the parties’ Technical Services Agreement
(TSA). 242 The TSA stated that Gagnon, the programmer, would
provide “specific add-on products” for an hourly fee, but did not
restrict AMS’s own ability to modify the program. 243 Finally:
[I]t defies logic that AMS would have paid Gagnon for his
programming services if AMS could not have used the programs
without further payment pursuant to a separate licensing
arrangement that was never mentioned in the TSA, and never
otherwise requested at the time. . . . [C]ustom software is far less
valuable without the ability to modify it. 244

VII. CONCLUSION
Most business works are created as works made for hire,
which vests the copyright in the employer rather than the
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1119–20.
239. Id. at 1120, 1126.
240. Id. at 1120 (citing Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d. 748, 757
(9th Cir. 2008) (“a ‘nonexclusive license supported by consideration is a
contract’ and is irrevocable”)).
241. Asset, 542 F.3d at 755.
242. Id. at 756.
243. Id. at 756–57.
244. Id. at 757.
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employee. The employment relationship will generally depend
on an existing common law agency relationship between the
parties. If an employer-employee relationship cannot be
established, then the work for hire doctrine may still have a
role for works that fall into enumerated categories, as long as a
proper written agreement is executed by both parties.
If there is no employment relationship, the work does not
fall into one of the nine statutory categories of speciallycommissioned works, and/or there is no adequate written
agreement characterizing such work as a work for hire or
otherwise assigning it to the hiring party, then a joint
authorship may be found. This generally requires that the
parties share in the creation of the copyrighted aspects of the
work. If a joint authorship cannot be established, then the
hiring party may still be able to claim an implied non-exclusive
license to use the work.
Establishing a work for hire by an employee in the scope of
employment, joint authorship, or an implied license does
require not a written agreement. Because the record may be
problematic, a written understanding of the relationship
between the parties is useful to resolve most copyright
ownership claims.
The characterization of a copyrighted work as a work for
hire, a joint work, an assignment, or a license affects not only
ownership but also is important to properly characterize
ownership, length of the copyright term, moral rights, exclusive
usage, and termination rights. The cases and examples
provided in this article should help a company navigate the
landscape of copyright ownership in the ever-changing world of
cyberspace.

